Turkey is an official candidate since the EU Helsinki Council decision in 1999. It has started accession negotiations with the EU in 2005 but the negotiations have been stalled by the EU in December 2006. Domestic resistance to the lifting of domestic barriers towards EU citizens’ land ownership (contradicting free movement of capital), EU citizens’ right to work (incompatible with free movement of labour) and towards the right of Greek Cypriot to transport goods (contrary to free movement of goods) poses severe threats to the Turkish prospects of becoming a full EU member. In order to align with the EU acquis, Turkey is obliged to forgo its restrictive attitude towards the EU free movement norms.
First, in land ownership case, Turkish legislation restricts EU citizens’ acquisition of land (See for example, the Protocol attached to the Founding treaty of Lausanne (1923), Village Law No.442 (1924), Reciprocity Act No.1062 (1927), Land Registry Law No.2644 (1934), Military Forbidden Zones and Safety Areas Law No. 2565 dated 1981). For instance, according to Village law dated 1924 (the year following the foundation of Turkish Republic) non-Turkish nationals cannot buy land from villages and “strategic” areas close to Turkish military zones. Furthermore the amount of land owned by foreigners cannot exceed certain limits. Finally, foreign legal persons are prohibited to own land (except under the conditions of Tourism and Investment Laws). In order to align with the EU, the pro-EU single-party government passed a new law lifting all these restrictions in 2003 (Law no. 4916, dated 3 July 2003). However, upon the request of the main opposition party, Turkish Constitutional Court decided to annul the new law on the grounds that it disregarded national sovereignty (Court decision no. 2005/14). In fact, Turkish Constitution (dated 1982) entails at least 4 provisions (Articles 6,7,8 & 9) interpreted as incompatible with the EU for prohibiting delegation of sovereignty (Baslar 2005). Moreover, the Court statement mentioned that there were also EU member states deviating from the EU norms in land ownership domain in order to justify its own restrictive stance. Public opinion is also very sensitive about the issue. The opposition parties successfully sought to mobilize (nationalistic, religious, eurosceptic) segments of Turkish society against the liberalization of Turkish land market. Reactionary arguments resonating in the public are mainly based on socio-economic problems, protracted sovereignty disputes with Greece, historical memories on Turkish national independence war against European forces, historical dispute with Armenians claiming genocide recognition and territorial compensation as well as anti-zionist and xenophobic sentiments. In order to avoid a backlash, the government decided to follow the established restrictive attitude in land ownership domain.
Secondly, concerning foreigners’ right to work in Turkey, there are also legal restrictions dating back to as early as 1932. Particularly, several professions are reserved to only Turkish nationals. For instance according to the individual legal acts relevant to these professions, foreigners are not allowed to work as seamen, doctor, engineer, nurse, architect, lawyer, prosecutor, miner, pilot, notary public or veterinarian. According to the 1932 law, the list of professions restricted to Turkish nationals was more comprehensive. Yet, in 2003, the pro-EU Turkish government passed a new law (no. 4817) partially easing the restrictions towards foreigners in Turkey. Then, in May 2007 the government prepared a rather more pro-liberal Act (no. 5665). However, Turkish President of the time vetoed the new law in June 2007 on the grounds that it was incompatible with national interests (Presidency statement no. B.01.0.KKB.01-18/A-8-2007-437 07 / 06 / 2007). Presidency statement announced that the EU member states held also restrictions towards foreigners in that domain. As a reaction, the EU progress report on Turkey (November 2007) stated that restrictions impeded Turkish alignment with the EU acquis.
Finally, there is a domestic resistance towards the free movement of goods carried by Cypriot Greek vessels and airplanes in Turkey. The main reason for resistance is due to the perception of the Cyprus conflict (a sovereignty conflict between Turkish and Greek Cypriots dating back to 1960s according to the former and 1974 according to the latter) as a “national cause” by Turkey. Particularly the Turkish military emphasizes explicitly on the significance of Cyprus problem for Turkish national security (See Hurriyet, 11 April 2008). Consequently, violating its obligations under the Customs Union signed in 1996 between Turkey and the EU, Turkey doesn’t allow Greek Cypriot transportation of goods to Turkish territories.
Nevertheless, since 2002 Turkish government has been remarkably more pro-liberal than previous governments over the issue. The Prime minister stated that the resolution of the Cyprus problem was the government’s priority and accused previous Turkish governments of persevering the conflict. Additionally, Turkish government discussed the possibility to give concessions in Cyprus issue in order to become an EU member. It also explicitly supported the UN reunification plan (known as Annan Plan) without any support from the main opposition. However, the UN plan failed (due to the Greek Cypriot rejection in referandum) and the Greek Cypriot administration adhered to the EU in 2004 under the title of “Republic of Cyprus”. Hence, Greek Cyprus has acquired a political veto power against Turkish EU membership.
Furthermore, the EU Council on 17 December 2004 concluded that the official start of accession negotiations with Turkey was conditional upon the latter’s signing a protocol expanding Turkish Customs Union to the new members, including Greek Cyprus. This has been perceived as a political concession to Greek Cyprus because signing the protocol could also be interpreted as de facto recognition of the Greek Cypriot administration as the Republic of Cyprus. The government signed the protocol on 29 July 2005 but in order to appease nationalistic segments of Turkish society, it attached to the EU protocol a written declaration stating that it refuses to recognize (Greek) Cyprus. However, the EU sent a counter-declaration on 21 September 2005 explaining that the government’s declaration did not have any legal effect on Turkey’s obligations (to allow Greek Cypriot transportation of goods). Another pro-liberal attempt by Turkish government was a proposition to (Greek) Cyprus to the outcry of the main opposition accusing the government to “bargain” about a national cause. In January 2006, Turkish government proposed to allow Greek Cypriot transportation in return for their commercial cooperation with Turkish Cyprus. However, it was rejected. Finally, the EU Council of December 2006 decided to curtail accession negotiations with Turkey unless the latter lifts the restrictions towards Greek Cypriot vessels and airplanes on Turkish territories.
As observed in the three selected cases that could be considered as “hot topics”, the pro-EU Turkish government attempted to lift restrictions towards EU citizens in order to align with the EU free movement norms. However, in all cases it faced a resistance based on the national interest argument. Although national interest is an ambiguous concept, several veto players (opposition parties, Constitutional Court, Presidency) use it in order to block change in those policy areas. In this sense, it is crucial to investigate what national interest means and why there is a resistance in these policy domains in Turkey.
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